

to say so, of the difference in approach of the use of military force in maintaining peace and order and the use of police.

Two aspects: First of all, you recall I spoke of one of the tasks of the police force being that of identifying dangerous individuals. The military intelligence role in countries is directed generally toward external threats rather than internal threats. It is normally the police who handle the internal threats.

So the investigative work that Mr. Engle has spoken of, including the identification of subversive groups, is a function for the police, just as, I may say, in this country there is a distinction between the role of the FBI and G-2.

Second, with regard to the control of violence, Mr. Congressman, I tried to indicate that the police deal with and respond with a different level of force than do the military. The weaponry is different, the techniques of handling the use of force is different because you are dealing with a different level of force.

In short, the military is usually called in, or in our view should be called in, only if the normal police enforcement is not adequate to handle the job.

In short, the roles, as I see them, sir, are complementary and have to be viewed in that way. Therefore I believe that the military training that is available is not the proper training for the police role.

Mr. GROSS. Aren't we training troops in this country to go into a country, to operate as agents on the civil level? Haven't we been training uniformed personnel for this purpose?

Mr. WOLF. You mean the occupation role once a country would be conquered?

Mr. GROSS. Yes. That plus counterinsurrection, counterrevolutionary tactics?

Mr. WOLF. I think that is a different situation than the situation—

Mr. GROSS. It may be a different situation with respect to our training, in assigning police officers to Montgomery, Ala., or to Waterloo, Iowa, for training with the police forces of those countries, but it doesn't seem to me it is incompatible with your training in the Academy in Panama or Operation Moccasin.

Mr. WOLF. Military counterinsurgency training might be desirable as additional training, Mr. Congressman, but does not give the basic fundamental training that is needed for police work.

Mr. GROSS. That is all.

Mr. SELDEN. Off the record a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SELDEN. On the record.

Mr. GROSS, do you have any further questions?

Mr. GROSS. I think not.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Wolf, I want to thank both you and Mr. Engle for appearing before the subcommittee this morning.

If there are no further questions, the subcommittee will adjourn at this time.

(Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene Tuesday, March 5, 1963.)

CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs met, pursuant to notice, in room HB-31, U.S. Capitol, at 10 a.m., Hon. Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Mr. SELDEN. The meeting will come to order.

This morning we have with us the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Dr. Lincoln Gordon. Mr. Ambassador, we would like for you to discuss Castro-Communist subversive activities in Brazil, and inform us of the general situation in Brazil. When you have finished doing so, we will want you to answer whatever questions the committee members may wish to pose.

We are in executive session, but your testimony will be recorded; however, any information that might be kept as part of the record will have to be cleared by yourself and the Department of State.

Mr. Ambassador, please proceed.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT BY HON. LINCOLN GORDON, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL

GENERAL SITUATION IN BRAZIL

The resignation of President Quadros in late August 1961 was something of a political earthquake in Brazil, totally unexpected by both Brazilians and foreigners. Vice President Goulart, now the President, was out of the country at that time. The then three military ministers believed he should not be allowed to come back and take office. They tried to keep him out. There was a period of 2 weeks of acute crisis, with a serious danger of civil war.

At the end of this period, early in September 1961 the Brazilian Congress acting by the required two-thirds majority of both houses, passed a constitutional amendment, changing the system of government from a presidential to a parliamentary regime. The understanding was that Goulart would be allowed to come back, but with his powers greatly reduced. He was sworn in as President on September 7, the Brazilian national holiday.

President Goulart accepted the parliamentary system at that time in order to preserve civil order in the nation. But it soon became clear

... compromise arrangement was not really workable. During the subsequent 16 months, political attention in Brazil was concentrated on the question of constitutional regime. A series of very complex political maneuvers finally resulted in a decision by the Congress that the issue should be resolved in a popular plebiscite which was held on January 6, 1963, 3 months after the congressional elections. The results were an overwhelming majority, 10 million out of 12 million votes of popular support for the return of full presidentialism.

Late in January, in response to the results of the plebiscite, Congress passed another constitutional amendment in proper form restoring the former 1947 constitution intact. For roughly 1 month, therefore, President Goulart has held full presidential powers.

The prolonged dispute about constitutional powers, parliamentarianism against presidentialism, so preoccupied attention during the course of 1962, that many of the substantive problems of government were inadequately cared for. Among the resultant unfortunate effects was an increase in the rate of inflation. Whereas from 1947 to 1958, the annual average rate of inflation was somewhere between 15 and 20 percent a year, from 1959 on it had been running between 35 and 50 percent a year, and last year hit 52 percent. This is an extremely severe rate of inflation, with serious adverse social and economic repercussions.

Other South American countries such as Chile and Bolivia, suffered even higher inflation in the past, but 1962 was the worst that Brazil has experienced. The problem of combating this inflation, while maintaining a high rate of growth, is the central problem confronting the new presidential government.

President Goulart is now in office until January 1966 when the original 5-year term of Quadros expires.

THE QUESTION OF COMMUNISM

The Communist Party is not illegal, as such, in Brazil, although it has been outlawed from the ballot since 1948; that is to say, it cannot run candidates under its own name. But the party operates openly. Its head, Luis Carlos Prestes, makes speeches, writes newspaper articles, and is known by all to be the head of the Communist Party in Brazil.

They have a weekly newspaper. They give their support to certain candidates in almost all of the parties. Political party life in Brazil is very complex, including three large parties, two medium-sized parties, and nine small parties. In closely fought elections, it is customary for non-Communist candidates to accept or even to welcome Communist support. Such support has most often gone to candidates of the Labor Party, which is the most leftwing of the three large parties. But the Communists have played their political game very skillfully, often giving the impression that they control more votes than they really do, and persuading candidates to seek their support in a close election among several non-Communists. The estimates of the numbers of Communist Party members is small for a country of 75 million people, ranging between 25,000 and 40,000.

There is a small dissident party, now-a-days quite vocal, which appears to follow more a Chinese and Cuban type line than the Moscow line. This line is followed by the well-known Francisco Juliao, the organizer of the peasant leagues in the northeast of Brazil.

Communists as such cannot be on the ballot, but some ran, on other tickets, in the congressional elections of October 1962 and a few (less than 2 percent of the membership) were elected to the present Congress.

What are the main fields of influence of the Communists? Their number is small, but their influence is much larger than those small numbers would suggest. The principal field of infiltration and influence is in the labor unions. In the Government itself there has been infiltration. The student movement is another major area of penetration with the National Student Union now being dominated by Communists.

THE CUBAN PROBLEM

Cuban influence in Brazil is quite secondary to Soviet and Chinese Communist influence. The Communist problem in Brazil existed long before Castro got control of Cuba and would exist even were Castro to disappear tomorrow.

Many Brazilians regard Cuba as a small, remote country, of no great importance to them. At first, they were very sympathetic toward Fidel Castro. The process of disillusionment has taken place much more slowly than in the United States. Nonetheless, Brazilian popular sympathy for Castro has greatly declined—especially since Castro's own statement that he has been a Marxist-Leninist all his life, and since the revelation of the offensive Soviet missile bases in Cuba.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC

Between 1947 and 1961, the Soviet Union and Brazil did not have diplomatic relations. They had been established immediately after the war (as a result of the wartime alliance) but were cut off by Brazil in 1948 as a result of Soviet press attacks on the Brazilian military. Relations were continued throughout this period, however, with Czechoslovakia and Poland.

When Janio Quadros came into office in 1961, he indicated that he thought that relations should be restored. His argument was that all the large Western democracies had relations with the Soviet Union, Brazil was getting to be more important in the world, and it was reasonable for Brazil to do what the other large democracies did. He resigned before he was able to put the policy into effect but it was carried out by his successors, diplomatic relations being restored in November 1961. There are limitations on the numbers and movements of Soviet diplomats, generally following a policy of reciprocity with the treatment given in Moscow to the Brazilian Embassy there. The Soviet Embassy staff is limited to 35.

Brazil has a modest amount of trade with the Soviet bloc. A new bilateral trade agreement with the Soviet Union was recently announced. The previous agreement called for trade up to \$70 million and this one aims at doubling it. The main reason for Brazilian in-

in this trade is that their markets in the free world for traditional exports (coffee, cocoa, vegetable oils) have not been expanding very rapidly. They have huge coffee surpluses, which have resulted in stocks equivalent to more than 2 years of normal exports. As they see it, trade in these surplus products with the Soviet bloc adds to their total trade without doing any harm to their free world trade. Exports to the Soviet Union have been confined to coffee, cocoa, vegetable oils, and tropical agricultural products. Imports have consisted mainly of wheat, petroleum, and machinery. As a whole, the trade amounts to less than 10 percent of total Brazilian trade.

There has been some expansion of cultural contacts with the Soviet Union, including a Soviet industrial exposition and a number of theatrical, ballet and art expositions.

(The committee thereupon proceeded in further executive session to question the witness.)

(At 12:52 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene Wednesday, March 6, 1963.)

CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs met, pursuant to adjournment, in room HB-31, U.S. Capitol, at 10:00 a.m., the Honorable Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Mr. SELDEN. The meeting will come to order, please.

We have with us again this morning the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Edwin Martin, who consented to return and answer whatever questions the committee members would like to pose.

I might add, Mr. Martin, that if you would like to say anything in connection with the recent trip you have just made to the Dominican Republic, we will be happy to have that information.

In the overall cold war strategy as planned by our U.S. Department of State what priority does Latin America currently have in that strategy?

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN M. MARTIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. MARTIN. I think the President has said at a recent press conference that Latin America represents a first priority for the United States. On the other hand, I would not want to overemphasize the question of priorities. I had some experience during the war when I was, for a time, in charge of the priority system for this country, and one of the first things you learn is that where everything is in a type of war situation, which we are now in, there are a great many things which are of importance. It is a matter of degree.

As people from the Defense Department used to tell us: It is just as important that a soldier have socks as even a gun, because he can't get there to shoot without socks to walk in.

I think that we are in a situation in which any gains by the Soviets anyplace in the world represent a defeat for us, not just local but with broader implications, because their future is built on maintaining momentum, an image of the wave of the future. It is this which we wish to refute and defeat, and it helps us everywhere when we are able to prevent them from making gains or even cause retreats, as we did last October with respect to the missiles in Cuba.